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Stubbs: Florida's Criminal Procedure Rule Number One
NOTES

FLORIDA'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE NUMBER ONE
In Gideon v. Wainwright, the United States Supreme Court held
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 2 requires a
defendant in criminal prosecutions in state courts to be represented
by counsel, unless intelligently waived. The Florida Supreme Court
has held the Gideon rule not applicable to misdemeanors;3 however, the United States Supreme Court has not faced this issue. The
Florida court's decision was reached because the Gideon decision
dealt with a felony and because section 27.51 of the Florida Statutes
limits the duties of the public defender to indigent defendants ac4
cused of noncapital felonies.
During the first eighteen days following this decision, the Florida
Supreme Court received one hundred nineteen petitions for writs of
habeas corpus. This was more than one-third of the number of such
petitions received in the entire year of 1962. 5 Recognizing the
heavy burden the potential number of petitions for writs of habeas
corpus would place on the supreme, district, and circuit courts, 6 the
Florida Supreme Court on April 1, 1963, promulgated Criminal
Procedure Rule No. 1:7
Rule No. 1. Motion to vacate, set side or correct sentence;
hearing; appeal
A prisoner in custody under Sentence of a court established
by the Laws of Florida claiming the right to be released upon
the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or Laws of the United States, or of the State of
Florida, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose
such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral
attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the
* A table of headings and subheadings is appended at the end of this note.
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
3. Fish v. State, 159 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1964).
4. For a full discussion of the Fish case see Comment, 17 U. FLA. L. REv.
(1965).
5. Roy v. Wainwright, 151 So. 2d 825, 827 (Fla. 1963).
6. In Florida, petitions for writs of habeas corpus must be directed to the
supreme, district, or circuit courts, or to members thereof. FiA. CONsT. art. V,

§§4 (2), 5(3), 6(3).
7. FLA. R. CraM. P. 1.
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court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the prosecuting attorney of the court, grant a prompt hearing thereon,
determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions
of law with respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence
imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render
the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall
vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the
prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the
sentence as may appear appropriate.
A court may entertain and determine such motion without
requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.
The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a
second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the
same prisoner.
An appeal may be taken to the appropriate appellate court
from the order entered on the motion as from a final judgment
on application for a writ of habeas corpus.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this rule, shall not be entertained if it appears that
the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the
court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him
relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
This rule shall not apply to municipal courts.
The foregoing rule shall become effective upon the filing
of this order.
[Order filed April 1, 1963.]
Although promulgation of the rule was a direct result of the Gideon
decision, it is not limited to cases in which lack of representation by
counsel is alleged. A Rule 1 motion may be made by any prisoner
"claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence
was imposed in violation of the Constitution or Laws of the United
States, or of the State of Florida, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess
of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack ... ,"s

Rule 1 provides that these post-conviction collateral attacks on
criminal convictions are to be made by motion to the trial court
8.

Ibid.
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that imposed sentence, rather than by petitions for writs of habeas
corpus to circuit or district courts or to the supreme court. The rule
was patterned after the United States Code, volume 28, section 2255,
and the only changes made were those necessary to adopt the federal
rule to Florida law.9 The reasons for adoption of the federal rulelo
were applicable to the promulgation of Rule 1:11 the records of the
trial are more readily accessible to the sentencing court and since
many habeas corpus decisions are shown to be obviously frivolous
when compared with the record, ready availability of the record is
desirable.12 Also, witnesses are more readily available in the proximity
of the sentencing court, 3 making an intelligent decision on the motion possible without loss of valuable time.
The anticipated landslide of collateral attacks that were responsible
for the court's promulgation of Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1 has
become an actuality; in less than two years orders denying in excess
of one hundred fifty motions have been appealed.
The purpose of this note is to compile the case law that has resulted from Rule 1, thus consolidating, to some extent, the mass of
decisions. This material is at best, however, an introduction to
Criminal Rule of Procedure Number 1 inasmuch as the appellate
courts are continuing to issue opinions with as much profusion as at
any time since the rule was promulgated. Apparent differences of
opinion between the district courts will be discussed.
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS OF A RuLE ONE MOTION

In the first Florida Supreme Court decision- construing Rule 1,
Justice Thornal advised those who would use the rule that, 5
it is essential that motions should at least be legible. Preferably,
they should be printed or typed. . . . [A] motion under the
rule should set out the factual basis which is alleged in support of the relief sought. It should allege also whether any
prior similar motion has been filed, the court where filed, and
the disposition thereof. The factual allegations should be supported by oath as to their truth. A motion for relief under the
rule should be filed with the clerk of the court where the conviction occurred.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Roy v. Wainwright, supra note 5, at 828.
See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213 (1962).
Roy v. Wainwright, supra note 5, at 828.
See United States v. Hayman, supra note 10, at 213.
Ibid.
Roy v. Wainwright, supra note 5.
Id. at 828.
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The allegation of a prior motion is desirable because the rule
provides that the sentencing court is not required to entertain a
second motion. 16 It is not clear whether this extends to a situation in
which the dismissal of an insufficient motion is without prejudice and
a second motion is filed by the movant.17 Refusing to allow a second
motion in such a situation would defeat the spirit of the Gideon decision and also negate any practical reason for affirming dismissals
without prejudice. The movant would be prohibited from filing a
second motion regardless whether the summary dismissal was affirmed
with or without prejudice.
Relying on Justice Thornal's advice, the prosecuting attorney in
Ashley v. State' s contended that the motion must be verified by oath
before consideration by the trial court. The Second District held
that the trial court could have the motion verified whenever convenient. This was further clarified in a later case1 9 in which the same
court reasoned that the oath must be taken before the hearing, but
was not a prerequisite for the trial court's jurisdiction.
Other technical requirements that need no explanation are as
follows:
(1) The movant may only attack the proceeding that resulted
in the sentence he is serving at the time of his motion under Rule
1.20 His imprisonment under a different sentence will not suffice.21
(2) Rule 1 is not available to review questions that have been
22
previously decided on appeal.

(3) A second trial granted under a Rule 1 motion does not
place the movant in double jeopardy as the first judgment is con23

sidered void.

In considering the technicalities of motions under Rule 1, courts
should give the movant every possible benefit of doubt; 24 "a prisoner

is almost always unskilled in the law and cannot be held to a high
standard of pleading.

16.

17.
18.
19.
20.
So. 2d
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

' ' 25

FLA. R. CRIa,. P. 1.

See Turner v. Wainwright, 164 So. 2d 269 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
158 So. 2d 530 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
Sampson v. State, 158 So. 2d 771, 774 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
Joyce v. State, 167 So. 2d 117 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Nabozny v. State, 163
765 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
McCormick v. State, 164 So. 2d 557 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
Chavigny v. State, 163 So. 2d 47 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
Little v. Wainwright, 161 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1964).
Andrews v. State, 160 So. 2d 726 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
Ashley v. State, 158 So. 2d 530, 531 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
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SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF RULE ONE MOTIONS

A prisoner moving under Rule 1 faces several procedural possibilities. His motion may be summarily dismissed. If the motion shows
that grounds for a new trial may exist, the movant will be granted a
hearing. The hearing may result in a dismissal of the motion, if the
allegations are not substantiated, or it may result in a new trial if the
allegations are shown to have merit. In examining the cases discussing Rule 1, it is important to ascertain the state of the proceeding in
question.
The trial court receiving the motion may dismiss it without a
hearing only if "the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief."26 Thus the
trial court contemplating summary dismissal may not consider matters
not presented in the motion, files, or records in evaluating the merits
27
of the attack.
In summarily denying the motion in Beadles v. State,28 the trial
court relied on the movant's three prior convictions as evidence that
he should have been aware of his right to counsel. Because of this
awareness, he was held to have waived his right to legal assistance.
The Second District reversed and remanded for hearing since the
three prior convictions were not reflected in the motion or the record
of the proceeding under attack.
THE NATURE OF A RULE ONE MOTION

In State v. Weeks 29 the Florida Supreme Court established the civil,
as opposed to criminal, nature of a Rule 1 motion. All three Florida
district courts had previously held that an indigent defendant was
entitled to counsel on appeal from an order denying his motion.30
The Second District first held that an indigent had a right to counsel
on a Rule 1 motion in the trial court. 3' These decisions were reached
by analogy: Since the right of an indigent to counsel on direct review
of his criminal conviction had been established, a similar right to
counsel existed in a collateral attack on the conviction based upon
26. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.
27. Wiliams v. State, 165 So. 2d 197 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Keur v. State, 160 So.
2d 546, 548 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
28. 162 So. 2d 4 (2d D.G.A. Fla. 1964).
29. 166 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1964).
30. Mullins v. State, 157 So. 2d 701 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1963); Weeks v. State, 156
So. 2d 36 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963), reversed, 166 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1964); Dias v. State,
155 So. 2d 662 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
31. Turner v. State, 161 So. 2d 11 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Keur v. State, 160 So.
2d 546 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Hall v. State, 160 So. 2d 527 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
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constitutional ground.3 2 Recognition was given to the decisions of
the federal courts under section 2255 of the United States Code holding that no right to counsel existed in collateral proceedings; however,
the district courts reasoned that since these decisions were prior to
33
Gideon, they were no longer valid.
The Gideon decision extended an absolute guaranty of counsel
to noncapital felony prosecutions brought in state courts. This
guaranty had long existed under the sixth amendment in criminal
proceedings in the federal courts. 34 The Florida district courts, in
holding that counsel was required in Rule 1 proceedings, failed to
distinguish between criminal proceedings and civil proceedings. 3 A
motion under Rule 1 is civil and thus is not to be considered a step in
a criminal proceeding. 36 The reluctance of the district courts to rely
on federal decisions was unfounded as there was a constitutional
guaranty of counsel in federal criminal prosecutions even prior to
Gideon. Although the Florida Supreme Court in Weeks was faced
with only the question of right to counsel on appeal from a Rule 1
decision, Justice Thornal stated "a proceeding under Rule 1 is civil
in nature and analogous to post-conviction habeas corpus." 37 This
leaves little doubt that "there is no absolute organic right to the
assistance of counsel at a hearing on a Rule 1 motion or on appeal
from an adverse ruling thereon." 38 From this it is apparent that an
indigent is not entitled to counsel as a matter of right at any point
in a Rule 1 proceeding.
Justice Thornal qualified the holding in Weeks, however, by stating that due process of law may sometimes require counsel in proceedings under Rule 1. The due process of law referred to is that
suggested by section 12 of the Florida Declaration of Rights and the
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, rather than by
the provisions of section 11 of the Florida Declaration of Rights and
the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution.- 9 Section 12
of the Florida Declaration of Rights and the fifth amendment of the
Constitution both provide no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law ... "40 Section 11 of the
Florida Declaration of Rights and the sixth amendment to the United

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Dias v. State, supra note 30, at 663.
Weeks v. State, supra note 30, at 38.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
State v. Weeks, 166 So. 2d 892, 897 (Fla. 1964).
Id. at 895.
Id. at 897. (Emphasis added.)
Ibid.
Id. at 897.
U.S. CONsT. amend. V; FLA. CONsT. Decl. of Rights §12.
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States Constitution give an accused specific rights41 in criminal prose-

cutions and therefore does not apply to a Rule 1 proceeding because
of its civil nature.
Thus, although an indigent is not entitled to counsel in a Rule 1
proceedings as a matter of right, he may be entitled to counsel dependent upon whether the circumstances of the case require counsel
to insure a fair presentation of the prisoner's motion. 42 But if the
post-conviction proceedings are simplified and the issues are clearly
drawn, a fair hearing may be achieved without counsel.43 Although
the court in Weeks did not clarify the meaning of "simplified" and
"dearly drawn," it did indicate that all doubts as to the necessity of
counsel should be resolved in the prisoner's favor.
RELATION OF RULE ONE TO HABEAS CORPUS
44
Rule 1 provides that:

an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant
to this rule, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court
which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief,
unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
This provision of Rule 1 has been consistently adhered to by the
Florida courts.
If the petition for a writ of habeas corpus does not show that the
petitioner has moved under Rule 1, and Rule I is ostensibly adequate
to test the legality of his detention, the petition will not be entertained.45 Even though the petitioner may have moved under Rule 1,
if his motion was dismissed without prejudice and Rule I proceedings
appear adequate, his petition will not be entertained. 4 6 A prisoner
who withdraws an appeal from a Rule 1 motion may not petition for
a writ of habeas corpus on the same grounds as his withdrawn appeal
because he has not exhausted his Rule I remedy.47

41.

U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; FLA. CoNsT. Decl. of Rights §11.

42. State v. Weeks, supra note 35, at 897.
43. Ibid.
44. FLA. R. CPjm. P. 1.
45. E.g., Anderson v. Wainwright, 158 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 1963); Wittcop v. Wain-

wright, 151 So. 2d 635 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
46. Turner v. Wainwright, 161 So. 2d 12 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
47. Wiseman v. Wainwright, 162 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 1964).
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LACK OF REPRESENTATION AT STAGES OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCEEDING

A number of Rule 1 motions have alleged lack of representation at
4
various stages of the original criminal proceeding other than trial. 1
Lack of representation at arraignment is a valid ground for a Rule

1 motion in that the arraignment is considered a critical stage of the
proceedings. 49 Failure to provide counsel at the preliminary hearing,
however, is not violative of the prisoner's constitutional rights.5° A
preliminary hearing is not an essential step in due process; thus failure to provide counsel at such a hearing is not a deprivation per se
of a right guaranteed by due process of law.51 If the prisoner, however, is able to show that lack of counsel at the preliminary hearing
was prejudicial to subsequent proceedings, lack of representation may
52
have been a denial of due process of law.
A Rule 1 motion alleging lack of representation at sentencing presents a valid ground for collateral attack.53 The Second District, relying on the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion
in Martin v. United States,5 4 explains the critical nature of the time

of sentencing: the advisability of appeal must then, or shortly thereafter, be determined; this is the time for presenting the court facts
extenuating the offense; this is the time to correct errors in the
record.55 These considerations determine that representation by counsel at sentencing is essential to a fair trial.56
MOTIONS ALLEGING LACK OF REPRESENTATION: INSOLVENCY, WAIVER

A prisoner collaterally attacking his conviction on the ground that
he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel, faces a presumption that the conviction and judgment of guilty were correct.57 He
48. Although not directly on point, the United States Supreme Court holding
in Escobedo v. Illinois, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758 (1964) may affect the Florida position on
right to counsel at preliminary hearing. The narrow holding in Escobedo leaves
room for distinguishing Florida cases. Subsequent opinions, however, may extend
the right to counsel so as to conflict with the present law in Florida. See Comment,
17 U. FLA. L. REV. 634 (1965).
49. Rash v. State, 162 So. 2d 311 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Webster v. State, 156
So. 2d 890 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1963).

50. Blake v. State, 163 So. 2d 21 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
51. Rash v. State, 162 So. 2d 311 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Fauls v. State, 164 So.
2d 35 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
52. Sardinia v. State, 168 So. 2d 674, 677 (Fla. 1964).
53. Williams v. State, 165 So. 2d 197 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
54. 182 F. 2d 225 (5th Cir. 1960).
55. Id. at 227.
56. Evans v. State, 163 So. 2d 520 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
57. King v. State, 157 So. 2d 440 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
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must allege and prove "by a preponderance of the evidence that (1)
he was not represented by counsel; (2) he was financially unable to
employ counsel; and (3) he did not competently and intelligently
waive his right to counsel." 8 In other words, he faces presumptions
that he was represented; that he was financially able to employ
counsel; or that he waived his right to counsel. These requirements
established by the Second District in King v. State,59 have been
adopted by the First 6° and Third Districts.-1 The first of these requirements has given the courts little difficulty because presence of
counsel is usually determinable from the record; the other two, however, are the basis for a large percentage of the appellate decisions
concerning Rule 1 motions.
Insolvency
Failure to allege insolvency has led to the dismissal of many Rule
1 motions as legally insufficient. 62 A mere statement by the prisoner
that he was insolvent and without counsel at the time of his trial is
sufficient to entitle him to a full hearing, absent a clear showing in
the record that his statement is false.63 Affirmation on appeal of a
trial court's summary dismissal of a motion on the ground that insolvency was not alleged is invariably without prejudice and enables
the prisoner to enter another motion with the defect corrected. This
procedure should be simplified. The Florida Supreme Court should
require trial courts to give the petitioner a period to amend his
motion before allowing appeal. If the defect is not corrected, the
summary dismissal could be affirmed with prejudice thereby eliminating a second motion and appeal.
Waiver of Counsel
Unquestionably the issue that has arisen most often under Rule 1
is whether the prisoner waived his right to counsel at the original
criminal proceeding. There is a presumption that the right to counsel
was waived. If he alleges, however, that the trial court failed to advise him of his right to counsel and failed to offer counsel, the question of waiver is not present unless the record indicated otherwise or

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
159 So.
63.

Id. at 444.
King v. State, supra note 57.
See Dykes v. State, 162 So. 2d 675 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
See Wallace v. State, 163 So. 2d 797 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
E.g., Hoffman v. State, 163 So. 2d 797 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Beeson v. State,
2d 669 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
Hall v. State, 160 So. 2d 527 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
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the prosecuting attorney makes contradictory allegations of fact. 64

Waiver is "ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege."65
The Second District has taken the least stringent approach in the
right to counsel cases by giving the prisoners' motions the benefit of
every doubt.66 In Dixon v. State67 the prisoner had alleged he was
not represented by counsel at any time from arrest to sentencing.
After reviewing the record the trial court dismissed the motion as
legally insufficient. On appeal, the Second District court held the
prisoner's allegation did not negate waiver and that the lower court
would have had grounds for dismissal of the motion if it had not
consulted the record. The trial court, however, did consult the record
and found it silent. The silence of the record as to waiver destroyed
the presumption of waiver. Thus, the dismissal of the motion without
a full hearing was error.
A record that shows the trial court asked the defendant if he desired counsel, but does not reflect an answer by the defendant, is not
a sufficient showing of waiver.68 Although the record reflects that
the court asked the prisoner at arraignment if he desired counsel and
the defendant is shown to have declined, the Second District court in
Phillipsv. State6- has held the prisoner is entitled to a hearing. Only
one Second District case, Swinney v. State, 0 stands in opposition to
this principle. In that case, however, the defendant failed to allege
insolvency and he was apparently represented by counsel although
his attorney was not present at the trial proceedings. (If he had
declined counsel it would not have conclusively shown "an intelligent
waiver of a known right to free counsel.")71
The First District in Mankus v. State72 held that if the record
shows the prisoner declined counsel this conclusively shows waiver
of counsel, thus justifying summary dismissal of his motion by the
trial court. The trial court dismissed the prisoner's motion on the
ground that its allegations were not sufficient to overcome the contents of the record. The prisoner had alleged that at the time he
pleaded guilty to robbery he was insolvent and only eighteen years
64.
65.

King v. State, supra note 57.
Id. at 444.

66. E.g., Johnson v. State, 165 So. 2d 187 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Kennedy v.
State, 164 So. 2d 245 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Stewart v. State, 163 So. 2d 527 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
67. 163 So. 2d 771 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
68.

Ashley v. State, 158 So. 2d 530 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).

69.

164 So. 2d 858 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).

70.

166 So. 2d 451 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).

71. Phillips v. State, 164 So. 2d 858, 860 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
72. 161 So. 2d 547 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
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old, his mother and stepfather were not able to obtain assistance of
counsel, and he pleaded guilty because of fear, ignorance, and lack
of representation. These grounds are much more extensive than
those alleged in the motion before the Second District in Phillips,
yet here the dismissal was upheld on the basis that the record showed,
as in Phillips,*that the prisoner had merely declined counsel.
Not only is the Mankus decision by the First District difficult to
reconcile with the decision by the Second District court in Phillips,
it is also difficult to reconcile with its own prior decision in Mullins
v. State73 The prisoner in Mullins had pleaded guilty to a crime
against nature. His motion alleged that he was insolvent at the time
he entered his plea, that he was not advised and did not have full
knowledge of the charge, that his mother had only a fifth-grade education and was insolvent, and that neither he nor his mother were
able to obtain counsel. He further alleged that counsel was declined
by his mother because the judge did not tell her legal assistance
would be provided at no cost. The record revealed that when the
court offered the prisoner counsel, he and his mother declined. On
appeal, the court held that if these allegations were proved, the
prisoner would be entitled to relief. The order of dismissal by the
lower court was reversed and the cause remanded for a full hearing
on the motion.
The bases for waiver of counsel reflected by the records in Mankus
and Mullins are substantially the same. The only material difference
in the two motions is that Mullins alleged he was not aware of the
charge against him. This hardly seems to justify the conflicting
results. A distinction suggested in Spriggs v. State74 is that the crime
to which Mullins had pleaded guilty, a crime against nature, was a
complicated crime with many defenses; whereas the crime of robbery,
for which Mankus was sentenced, is more readily understandable
by the layman. The relation between ability to understand a crime
and intelligent waiver of counsel is not dear. If representation by
counsel is essential to the fairness of a criminal proceeding, the injustice brought by lack of representation is not cured because the
crime charged is easily understandable, even though the defendant
pleads guilty. The nature of the crime charged should be irrelevant
to the main point under consideration.
It is impossible to draw any definite conclusions concerning the
question of waiver of counsel from the opinions of the First District
court. With the possible exception of Mullins, this court has apparently been willing to find a conclusive showing of waiver from any

73.
74.

157 So. 2d 701 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
158 So. 2d 786 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
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indication in the record that defendant refused an offer of counsel.5
The court, however, has not been willing to hold that a plea of guilty
is indicative of waiver. 7 6 Nor has it been willing to hold that a prisoner must show that his plea of guilty resulted solely from absence of
counsel.77
The opinions discussing waiver of counsel by the Third District
are terse.78 They indicate this court's adoption of the less restrictive
view taken by the court in the Second District; however, the brevity
of these opinions precludes a clear statement concerning the elements
required by this court to negate the presumption of waiver.
The difference in the position of the district courts is one of
degree. The Second District has been the least willing to find waiver
of counsel. In light of the concept in Gideon that representation by
counsel is a fundamental element of a fair trial, this position seems
most desirable. The courts should not hold that a prisoner has waived
counsel unless the record clearly shows this fact.
RULE ONE ATTACKS ON PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH MOVANT
WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL

"[T]he test for granting relief under Rule 1, is whether or not
the appellant was deprived of the substance of a fair trial." 79 This test
has led the courts to reject many allegations in Rule 1 motions challenging criminal proceedings in which the defendant was represented
by counsel; because such allegations generally are not shown to
have deprived the movant of a fair trial.
Allegations that the movant was not taken before a magistrate
without unnecessary delay, 80 that the movant was illegally searched
and seized and property so obtained used at trial,s that the movant
8 was held incommunicado before being taken before the magistrate, 2
that movant's evidence was suppressed,3 and that the movant was
not granted a speedy trial, 8 4 have all been held insufficient under Rule
1 as not showing deprivation of a fair trial if the movant was represented by counsel at his trial. If the facts, however, that were the
75.

E.g., Hale v. State, 162 So. 2d 5 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Conley v. State, 160

So. 2d 752 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
76. Dortch v. State, 165 So. 2d 409 (lst
D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
77. Coleman v. State, 164 So. 2d 860 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
78. E.g., Wallace v. State, 163 So. 2d 797 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Tynes v. State,
163 So. 2d 19 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
79. Marti v. State, 163 So. 2d 506, 507 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
80. Id. at 507.
81. Duncan v. State, 161 So. 2d 718 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
82. Wooten v. State, 163 So. 2d 305 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
83. Harris v. State, 167 So. 2d 312 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
84. Marti v. State, supra note 79.
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basis for these motions were not available to counsel at the time of
trial, these allegations would have made valid Rule 1 motions.
An allegation that perjured testimony was used at trial is an
adequate allegation only if the movant also shows that the prosecuting officials knew it was perjured at the time of use.8 5 A showing
that the movant was denied the right to obtain witnesses is sufficient
to entitle him to a hearing.86 Dismissing a motion that alleges the
defendant's insanity at the time of his guilty plea is error if the
87
allegation is supported by sufficient facts.
A contention by the movant that the public defender refused to
appeal his prior conviction is sufficient allegation to entitle the movant
to a hearing.8 8
In Quillian v. State,8 9 the record reflected the presence of two attorneys at a trial involving three defendants. Since the record did
not clearly show whether the movant was represented by one of the
two attorneys, the Third District Court held that the movant was
entitled to a hearing on his motion.
The Third District has held that the competency of counsel employed by the defendant at the criminal proceeding cannot be questioned by a Rule 1 motion; 90 however, alleging the incompetency
of court-appointed counsel is proper under Rule 1 if the factual allegations are more than bare legal conclusions.91 This distinction between counsel employed by the movant and counsel appointed by
the state is based on the movant's implied waiver of the right to
question the competency of counsel whom he employs.9 2 If counsel
was employed by the court, however, the movant had no choice and
the incompetency of this counsel may have rendered an injustice and
will be grounds for a hearing on the motion. 93
A valid Rule 1 attack on movant's original criminal proceeding
in which movant was represented by counsel is French v. State.94 The
movant, facing felony and grand larceny charges, was insolvent and
requested court-appointed counsel. The court complied with his re85. Harris v. State, supra note 83; Brown v. State, 163 So. 2d 335 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1964); Gammage v. State, 162 So. 2d 529 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Austin v. State, 160
So. 2d 730 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
86. Byers v. State, 163 So. 2d 57 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
87. Knight v. State, 164 So. 2d 229 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
88. Jackson v. State, 166 So. 2d 194 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
89. 163 So. 2d 1 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
90. Everett v. State, 161 So. 2d 714 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
91. Simpson v. State, 164 So. 2d 224 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964). This distinction is
applied by the federal courts. E.g., Sears v. United States, 265 F. 2d 301 (5th Cir.
1959).
92. Simpson v. State, supra note 91, at 226.
93. Ibid.
94. 161 So. 2d 879 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
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quest, appointing counsel on the day of trial. Judge Wiggington,
speaking for the First District court, said this was tantamount to no
counsel at all.05 The right to counsel contemplates that the counsel
be given adequate time to prepare a defense.
APPEAL OF RULE ONE MOTIONS

All three district courts have adopted rules eliminating the movant's
costs in appealing orders entered on Rule 1 motions. 9 These rules
eliminate costs and fees to the same extent as Florida Appellate Rule
2, which eliminates costs in habeas corpus proceedings or appeals
therefrom, "arising out of or in connection with criminal causes or
convictions." 97 The rule also forbids trial court clerks from requiring
payment of fees or costs upon the movant's filing of a notice of appeal regardless of the movant's insolvency. The movant, however, is
not entitled to bail pending appeal of a Rule 1 order.9 8 Florida Appellate Rule 6.2 provides "any appeal by the defendant shall be
taken within 90 days after the judgment is entered, or from the
judgment or sentence, or both, within 90 days after the sentence is
entered." The Florida Supreme Court stated in Roy v. Wainwright
that appeal time from Rule 1 orders will be that governing criminal
appeals. 99 The district courts have followed this,100 citing Florida
Appellate Rule 6.2, although a Rule 1 order is technically neither a
judgment nor a sentence.
The ninety-day limit for appeal has produced a seemingly unjust
result in Burke v. State.101 The movant alleged that his appeal was
filed late because prison officials delayed in calling him to notarize
the appeal. The First District Court held the ninety-day requirement
95. Id. at 881.
96. In re Internal Government of the District Court of Appeal, 156 So. 2d 896
(1st D.C.A. Fla. 1963); 156 So. 2d 655 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963); 156 So. 2d 415 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
97. Ibid.
98. Simmons v. State, 163 So. 2d 888 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Gammage v. State,
154 So. 2d 712 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
99. 151 So. 2d 825, 828 (Fla. 1963).
100. Hood v. State, 163 So. 2d 893, 894 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Burke v. State,
160 So. 2d 523 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1964). In Hood v. State, the First District Court
quotes Ervin v. Smith, 160 So. 2d 518, 520 (Fla. 1964), a case that did not deal with
Rule 1. In Ervin the supreme court cites both Florida Appellate Rule 6.2 and
FLA. STAT. §924.09 for the ninety-day time limit for criminal appeals. Since Florida
Appellate Rule 6.2 apparently supersedes FLA. STAT. §924.09, it would seem proper
for only the Appellate Rule to be cited as authority. For a discussion of the conflict
between the Appellate Rules and existing Florida Statutes see Clark, Curable Ills
of the Criminal Law of Florida,16 U. FLA. L. REV. 258, 292 (1963).
101. 160 So. 2d 523 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
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to be absolute, suggesting that the movant's only possible relief would
be if the federal courts would entertain a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.
On appeal from an order entered after a hearing by the trial court
on his Rule I motion, the movant is entitled to a full 'record of such
hearing. 10 2 He is only entitled, however, to such parts of the record of
the original proceedings as are related to his collateral attack under
Rule 1.103

Over twenty-five Florida judgments have been vacated and remanded to the Florida Supreme Court by the United States Supreme
'
Court "for further consideration in light of Gideon v. Wainwright."104
The Florida Supreme Court has declined to issue writs of habeas corpus in these cases, but has so refused expressly without prejudice
to the petitioner's rights under Rule 1. This procedure was adopted
in light of the recognition by the federal courts of the effectiveness
of a post-conviction motion under section 2255 of the United States
Code. The Florida Supreme Court has indicated it would defeat
the purpose of Rule 1, which is to lighten its burden, if it reverted to issuing writs of habeas corpus in these cases vacated by the
105
Ufiited States Supreme Court.
The Florida Supreme Court has never questioned the retroactivity
of Gideon and has proceeded on the basis that the holding is retroactive. 0 6 Mr. Justice Harlan, however, raises this question in his dissent to a per curiam opinion of the Supreme Court.107 The Supreme
Court vacated ten Florida judgments, all of which had been entered
prior to Gideon. Although Mr. Justice Harlan reserved his opinion as
to Gideon's retroactive nature, he urged the Court to decide the question. It would be ironic, in light of the burden that the Gideon decisions placed on Florida courts, if the Supreme Court should, in the
future, decide Gideon was not retroactive.
CONCLUSION

The attitude reflected in the Florida opinions discussing Rule 1
motions has been commendable in light of the added burden placed
on the courts by the Gideon decision. This has been true notwithstanding the fact that more than fifty per cent of the circuit judges
102. Caminita v. State, 159 So. 2d 921 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
103. Harris v. State, 161 So. 2d 885 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
104. E.g., Banks v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 51, vacating 155 So. 2d 857 (2d D.C.A.
Fla. 1963); Mitchell v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2, vacating 152 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1963);
Kitchens v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2, vacating 152 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1963).
105. Gideon v. Wainwright, 153 So. 2d 299, 301 (Fla. 1963).
106. Roy v. Wainwright, 151 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1963).
107. Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2, 3 (1963).
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have not been called upon to decide a Rule 1 motion108 Occasionally
the opinions have expressed exasperation with obviously frivolous
motions.' °9 A motion stating an allegation that the movant unquestionably knows is false is frivolous. In Breamfield v. State'" movant
alleged he had not been represented at trial by counsel. The trial
record clearly showed that he had been represented. The Third
District, affirming dismissal of the motion, suggested instigation of
disciplinary procedures to combat such allegations."' Such a suggestion has merit; the burden on the courts is heavy enough without
requiring review of obviously false motions.
Only one case has been found in which the spirit of Rule 1 has
been flagrantly violated by the trial court." 2 The Second District reversed the Criminal Court of Record for Orange County, which had
denied the prisoner's motion. The record of the hearing showed that
the trial court began reading its order of denial before hearing testimony in behalf of the movant; this is "a procedure which is unknown
in our jurisprudence and improper, to say the least." 1 3
Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1 has served the purpose of distributing the burden placed on Florida courts by the Gideon decision.
In addition, the rule allows attacks on other aspects of the original
criminal proceeding to be brought in the court that imposed sentence.
The rule was instigated by the Gideon decision, and its emphasis
has been on insuring a fair trial. Despite the overwhelming burden
motions under the rule have placed on our Florida courts and the
obviously frivolous nature of many motions, the opinions reflect a
commendable, patient attitude on the part of our judiciary.
SIDNEY

108.

A.

STUBBS, JR.

For a discussion of the defects in the operation of Rule 1 see Clark,

Curable Ills of the Criminal Law of Florida, 16 U.

FLA.

L. REv. 258, 294 (1963).

109. E.g., Little v. Wainwright, 161 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1964).
110.

166 So. 2d 484 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).

111. Id. at 485.
112. Dickens v. State, 165 So. 2d 811 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
113. Id. at 814.
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